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SEVENTH CIRCUIT CONSTRUES
SECTION 23(a) OF THE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
ACT TO LIMIT LIABILITY
IMPOSED ON
MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently interpreted § 23(a) of
the Consumer Product Safety Act ("the CPSA"),
15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982), to limit liability imposed on manufacturers or sellers. Section 23(a)
provides a private right of action for consumers
injured "by reason of" a manufacturer's or
seller's violation of a "consumer product safety
rule or any other rule or order" issued by the
Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission ("the Commission"). In Zepik v.
Tidewater Midwest, Inc., 856 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.
1988), the court decided that §23(a) liability does
not extend to a manufacturer's or a seller's violation of certain reporting, rules promulgated by
the Commission.
Factual Background
On June 30, 1983, Ronald Zepik dove into the
shallow end of a swimming pool and struck his
head on the bottom. The accident left him a
quadriplegic. Zepik brought an action under §
23(a) of the CPSA against five manufacturers and
sellers of component parts of the pool, including the defendant, Tidewater Midwest, Inc.
("Tidewater"). Pleasure Industries, Inc., ("Pleasure") manufactured the pipes of the pool and
provided a manual that was consulted during
the pool's construction; Loren's Pool and Supply, Inc. ("Loren's"), sold supplies and constructed the pool, excavated the hole, and provided technical assistance; the Frost Company
("Frost") sold the ladder for the pool; and
Polynesian, Inc. ("Polynesian"), manufactured
the wall and coping tiles.
Section 23(a) provides that anyone who is
injured may sue if the injury is sustained "by
reason of any knowing (including willful) violation of a consumer product safety rule or any
other rule, or order issued by the Commissioner." 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982). Zepik alleged
that the defendants failed to comply with the
regulatory reporting requirement of Part 1115 of

the reporting rules promulgated by the Commission. 16 C.F.R. pt. 1115 (1989). Specifically,
Zepik contended that the defendants' failure to
notify the Commission of the dangers posed by
diving into the shallow waters of the pool constituted a violation of the Commission rule. In
addition, Zepik claimed relief based on several
state law theories of recovery, including strict
liability, negligence, willful and wanton misconduct and breach of express and implied warranties.
Procedural Background
In the district court, the defendants brought
several pretrial motions to dismiss as well as
motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed with prejudice the claim against Tidewater Midwest. The court also granted motions
for summary judgment in favor of Pleasure,
Frost, and Polynesian. The court reasoned that
the Part 1115 reporting requirements do not
require a manufacturer of component parts to
report a potential defect in the final product, the
completed pool.
Loren's sought dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that a recent Eighth Circuit case,
Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603 (8th Cir.
1986), held that § 23(a) does not extend to violations of reporting requirements because such
rules are interpretive rather than legislative. The
district court agreed, and granted Loren's motion to dismiss the CPSA claims.
Seventh Circuit Interprets "Any Other Rule"
as Used in Section 23(a)
The issue on appeal was whether the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants Pleasure, Frost and Polynesian and whether it properly granted Loren's
motion to dismiss. The dismissal order entered
in favor of Tidewater was not challenged. To
decide these matters, the court was required to
interpret the phrase "any other rule" as used in
§ 23(a).
Zepik argued that under Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls, Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md.
1981) and its progeny, the phrase "any other
rule" is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. According to Butcher, "any other rule" is
not limited to consumer product safety rules
and does not distinguish between legislative and
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interpretive rules. Rather, "any other rule"
means any rule promulgated by the Commission. Section 23(a), therefore, encompasses coverage for injuries sustained by virtue of a manufacturer or seller violating reporting requirements.
Part 1115 of the Commission's rules mandates
that a manufacturer or seller must report known
product defects to the Commission. Zepik contended that the defendants violated Part 1115
because they failed to report the dangers of
diving into shallow waters. Zepik argued that he
could maintain a private right of action against
the defendants because the Commission's reporting rules, encompassing Part 1115, fell within
the scope of "any other rule" under § 23(a).
The defendants, however, urged the court to
adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach in Drake.
Drake was decided while the defendants' motions attacking Zepik's complaint were pending
in the lower court. In Drake, the court reasoned
that the reporting requirements of Part 1115 are
interpretive, and that relief is not available
under § 23(a) for alleged violations of interpretive rules.
Seventh Circuit Construes "By Reason Of"
Narrowly
Looking to the language of § 23(a), the Seventh Circuit first noted, as the Eighth Circuit had
in Drake, that Congress did not intend to include
relief under § 23(a) for violations of interpretive
rules. Interpretive rules serve merely to clarify
statutory provisions. The court concluded that
the Part 1115 reporting rules, being interpretive,
do not fall with the ambit of § 23(a) relief. In
further support of this conclusion, the court analyzed the "by reason of" provision of § 23(a). By
using the phrase "by reason of," Congress envisioned availability of a private right of action
only upon a showing of causation similar to that
required under common law tort liability. Accordingly, in order to recover under § 23(a),
there must be a direct and proximate causal
connection between a consumer's injury and
the defendant's violation of a Commission rule.
The court stated that to establish the causation
requirement, the plaintiff must show that: 1) the
failure to inform the Commission that diving
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into the pool could be hazardous "reasonably
supported" a conclusion that the product was
defective, and that the defendant deprived the
Commission of information otherwise not available to it; 2) if the information had been
reported to the Commission, the Commission
would have found an existing product defect
and would have required that curative steps be
taken; 3) the Commission's response would
have been fully implemented in time to prevent
the plaintiff's injury; and 4) the curative steps
taken at the direction of the Commission would
have actually prevented the plaintiff's injuries.
The court determined that Zepik's injuries
were too remote to meet the causation requirement of § 23(a). To hold otherwise would have
the effect of imposing broader liability, similar to
enterprise liability, upon any manufacturer or
seller of the subject product. The court stated
that this was not Congress' intent:
If Congress had intended to bring about such a radical
expansion of products liability... it certainly could have
done so... [Wle see no indication in the legislative history
or the structure of the CPSA that section 23(a)'s 'by reason
of' language was intended to be construed so broadly...

Zepik, 856 F.2d at 944. Enterprise liability relaxes
traditional causation requirements when the
injured plaintiff is unable to accurately identify
the manufacturer or seller of the allegedly
defective product. Here, Zepik was able to identify the manufacturers and sellers involved in the
construction of the pool.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Zepik's claim against Loren's
and the orders granting summary judgment in
favor of Pleasure, Polynesian and Frost. The
court remanded the case to the district court to
determine, whether, absent the § 23(a) claim, the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the state
claims for strict liability, negligence, willful and
wanton misconduct and breach of express and
implied warranties was appropriate. As a result
of the court's decision, an injured consumer
must now establish a direct and proximate
causal connection between the alleged violation of a Commission rule and the injury
sustained.
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